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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LA RENE HOLMES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 8988

vs.
P. C. HEIDEBRECHT,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
S'T~TEMEN'T OF FACTS
'The statement of fact which appe'ars in 1the
app~llant's brief is reasonably straighttforward and
in accordance with the evidence, with the exception
of that ma:terial which appears beginning on Page
4 of the 'appellant's brief.
1

With 'this material, which begins in the third
paragraph 'Of Page 4 relating to 'the distance Which
the plaintiff ha:d walked into Twelfth Street be'fore
the collisi'on occurred, the respondenrt m us t disagree.
1

'The statement that the plaintiff walked twenty1
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three feet from the south curb of Twelfth Street
to the point at which she was struck is, it appears,
a pure supposition on the part of plaintiff's counsel.
The evidence indicates that the position of the
plaintiff after the accident was thirteen feet eight
inches north of the south curb line of Twelfth
Street, and at a position thirty-two feet east of what
the officers determined to be the point of impact.
('Tr. 59).
Further, the officers testified that it was impossible to determine the exact point of impact and
that what they determined to be that point might
have been three or four feet away. (Tr. 61).
1

The investigating officers also testified that
the accident occurred on the south part of Twelfth
S'tree't and that the plaintiff was struck by the right
side of the defendant's car. (Tr. 66). The evidence
shows that the street is forty-two feet wide and the
distance from the south curb line to the center line,
even though it was unmarked, is twenty-one feet.
(Tr. 67).
On cross examination officer Vaughn Anderson testified that all of the defendant's car was in
the eastbound lane of traffic, that is, south of the
imaginary center line of Twelfth Street. He testified further tha:t in his opinion the defendant's car
was from six to seven feet wide. (Tr. 68). Thus it
would appear that the plaintiff had walked not
2
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twenty-three feet as counsel indicates in his brief,
but had walked twenty-one feet minus the six or
seven feet representing the width of the defendant's
car, or closer to fourteen or fifteen feet.
The plaintiff herse'l.f 'testified that as she began
to cross the street from south to north, she had her
back slightly turned to traffic approaching from
the west. ('Tr. 90). She further testified that just
as she stepped off the south curb, she looked west
and saw nothing. ('Tr. 91).
Lieutenant LeRoy G. Bennett was called as an
expert wi'tness by the plaintiff and appellant. Among
other things he testified that based upon studies
he had made, the average woman walked 4.11 feet
per second. He offered in his testimony some calculations based on the assumption that Mrs. Holmes
walked at about that speed.
Based upon his calculations as to the distance
the automobile would travel at twenty-five miles
per hour and the distance Mrs. Holmes walked
before the collision occurred, he testified as to what
in his opinion was the distance west of the point at
which Mrs. Holmes was standing on the curb the
defendant's car was located at the time she left the
curb.
He offered these calculations based on certain
facts submitted 'to him by counsel for the appellant.
3
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Upon cross-examination Mr. Young testified
thrut if she ('the appellant) had walked fifteen feet,
it would have taken her approximately 3.4·3 seconds
from the 'time she left the curb to reach the point
where the collision occurred, and further that the
defendant's car at the time the appellant left the
curb and proceeded across the street, was 125.74
feet west of the point of impact. (Tr. 102).
Based upon the physical evidence it would appear that approxima!tely three seconds after the
appellant left the curb and proceeded across the
stree't, 'the collis~ion occurred and that at the 'time
she left the curb and said she looked to the west,
she did n:ot see the defendant's car, which was then
only 125 feet from her.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COUR'T DID NOT COMMIT ERR'OR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 8.
POIN'T II.
'THE 'TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
APPELLAN'T'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTJ:ON NO.8.

·The first point argued by the appeltan't is ap4
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parerrtly that the court erred in g1v1ng Instruction No. 8. In argument under that point it appears
thaJt he objeets to the giving of Instruction No. 8
in view of the court's Ins'tructi'On No. 7 upon the
theory apparently 'that these instructions coll!tradict
each other.
I t is the position of the respondent tha!t these
instructions are not contradictory and that 'the evidence clearly shows that based upon ei!ther instruction or both, the 'appellant was guilty of contributory negligence as a ma:tter of law.
1

The appellant takes the position 'that Instruc1tion No. 8 was given erroneously and for that
reason the case should be reversed. Assuming for
purposes of argument, which fue responden t does
not admit, that the instruction was erroneous, it
does not necessarily invite or require a reversal of
this case based upon the record.
1

The court's attention is inv:i!ted 'to Corpus Juris
Secundum for a general statement found in v·ol.
5-A, Paragraph 1763-1 under the ti'tle "Appeal and
Error":
"As a general rule, the giving of an erroneous instruction will not constitute a
ground for reversal where 'the complaining
party has not been injured thereby. A judgment will not be reversed for error in the
giving of instructi'ons where the instructions
1

5
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are erroneous only as to other parties or when
the erroneous instru~tion is nort only not prejudicial but is in fact favorable to the complaining party * * *
"The principle that a judgment will ndt
be reversed for error in 'the giving of instructions, where the complaining party was not
prejudiced thereby, has also been applied in
actions for death and personal injuries."
It is ithe position of the respondent that the
instru~tions given that is, '7 and 8 - are not
prejudicial and that even if, as the appellant contends, Instruction No. 8 were erroneous, it does not
warrant a revers·al.
'The :statute upon which Instruction No. 8 is
based rs 41-6-79, U. C. A. 1953, which reads as
follows:
(a) "Every pedestrian crossing at a
roadway at any point other than within a
marked crosswalk or within an unm·arked
crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the
right-of-way 'to all vehicles upon the roadway."
It is apparently the position of the appellant
that an instruction based upon this statute is wholly
unintelligible and imposes an unreasonable burden
upon pedestrians and serves only to confuse jurors
to whom such an instruction might be given.
This does not appear to be the view of 'this
6
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court because the statute referred to is cited in a
good many Utah decisions, and in none does this
court say that the statute cannot be applied or tha;t
it is unintelligible or that it imposes unreasonable
burden upon pedestrians.
The cases we refer 'to include Cox v. Thompson,
245 P.2d 1049, and Smith v. Bennett, 265 P.2d 401.
The following quotation in this connection is referred to from Mr. J us'tice Wolfe's opinion in Cox
v. Thompson which appears at Page 1051 of 254
P.2d:
"On 'the evidence set forth the tri'al court
correctly found decedent contributorily negligent as a mat'ter of law. From a fair appraisal
of the evidence reasonable men can draw but
one inference and that inference points unerringly to the negligence of the decedent.
In response to a call from his wife, decedent,
who was walking east across a poorly lit
highway, turned and walked directly into the
path of defendant's automobile. Crossing a
highway at a point where there was no marked crosswalk, decedent was duty bound to yield
the right of way to a v.ehicle upon the roadway. See 41-6-79 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
(Emphasis ours.) This he failed to do. He, in
addi tion, apparently failed to look, or having
looked failed to see what he should have seen
and paid heed to it. He said nothing and did
nothing which indicated he was in any way
aware of the danger presented. Decedent was
properly found negligent as a matter of law."
1

At Page 10 of the appellant's brief, a refer7
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ence is made to Morrison v. Perry, 140 P.2d 722.
~ttention is called to ~he language of the court appearing on Page 10 of the appellant's brief relating
to a presumption of negligence when a viola'tion of
a statute has 'been proved 'and s'ays that the presumption remains unless there is an explana:tion offered
by the vio'la'tor of the statute.
W'ith respect to the argument that proof of a
violation of a statute such as the one in question here
raises only a presumption of negligence absent an
exp'lana'tion, the testimony is uncontradicted that
the plain'tiff could not offer any explanation because she fl'atly said that she never did see the defendant's car. (Tr. 91).
A't Page 12 of the appellant's brief there appears a quo:tation from 88 C.J.S., Page 903, relating
to error committed when instructions give improper
and undue emphasis to specific issues, theories, or
defenses. It is the contention of the respondent that
'the two instructions about which the 'appellant complains do not constitu'te an unnecessary or unusual
em ph'asis upon one phase of the case or place unnecessary emphasis upon the respondent's theory of
the case and tha't the respondent had a perfect right
to have these instructions 'submitted to the jury.
This court's attention is invited 'to the case of
Bruner v. McCarthy, 142 P.2d 649. This was an
8
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action for personal injuries to the plaintiff, a hostler, while assisting in the coaling of an engine.
Verdict and judgment were entered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, claiming, among
other things, that the defendant had been prejudiced
by the giving of instructions cTaimed 'to be erroneous.
One instruction complained of was reiative to 'the
safety appliance section of the Federal Employer's
Li'ability kct, and i't was ·adm'i!tted thaJt no safety
appliance vidlation was 'involved.

.

Wrth respect to this contention, the court, in
the opinion at Page 654, of 142 Pac. has 1the following to say:
"The next contention is that the lower
court comn1itted prejudicial error in giving
instructions on abstract princip'les of law
which were outside the issues and the evidence. Objection is m·ade to th'a!t portion of
instruction 7 in which the court read to the
jury part of the Federal Employers' Lia:biHty
Ac't 'including tha:t part which related 1to the
carrier's l'i'ability for injuries resulting from
'any defect or insufficiency, due to Its (the
carrier's) negligence in its cars, engines, ·appliances, machinery, track, ro'adbed, work
boa ts, wharves or other equipment. Adm'!ttedly there were no issues or evidence purporting to deal with defec'ts of insufficienCies.
It would have been better had this portion of
the instruction been om:ltted. Yelt we do ndt
think 'tha:t this was prejudicial error. A similar objection was made in K~tsturin v. Chicago
& Alton R. Co., 209 Ill. App. 55, where the
1

9
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court stated: 'The third instruction given at
appellee's request stated the substance of 1the
entire Federal Employers' Liability Act, including provisions therein not involved in this
case. We 'think the portion objected to might
well have been omitted, as said by us in a
former case, 'but still we do not think the
jury could have been misled to believe that
appellee could recover here for any defect
in appellant's track or roadbed.' ''
The appel'lant in the Bruner case further complained 'that an instruction was given respecting
f'ailure 'to keep the roadbed in proper condition. As
was the case w':Lth the safety appliance instruction,
there was no evidence of improperly maintained
roadbed or that such a condition might have had
anything 'to do with the accident which injured 'the
plaintiff.
With respeet to this contention the court said:
"'The defendants contend that the jury
may have concluded from this instruction that
defendants were charged with negligence in
failing to keep their equipment and roadbed
in proper condition. It could not so have concluded where 'there was no evidence remotely
showing any such negligence. Moreover, since
we have concluded that the evidence shows
negligence on the part of the defendants as
a!bove demonstrated as a matter of law, we
therefore must conclude that there could be
no prejudi'cial error in 'this regard."
Other instructions relating to issues not in10
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volved in the case were submitted by the court,
dbjected to by the appellant, bu!t the cour t rejected
the appellant's contentions, holding that they were
not prejudicial, and the court says the following
with respect to these addi tion'al contentions by the
appellant:
1

1

"Likewise there was no prejudicial error
in instructing the jury on rules of 'the ·road
even though those rules may have been inapplicable to 'the i'ssues raised. Such an instruction could have on'ly had the effect of
influencing the jury to believe that the defendants were negligent in failing to enforce
the rules. Since we have held that the defendants were negligent in other respects as a
matter of law, they could. not have been prejudiced by this instruction.
"The same holds true as to ins'truction
11 on the ''assum p'tion of risk' doctrine. No
such issue was raised by 'the pleadings or the
evidence and no good purpose could have been
served by the giving of such an instruction.
Yet this could not 'be prejudicial to the defendants, for even if 'the jury inferred from
the giving of such an instruction that 'the
doctrine of 'assumption of risk' applied, the
defendants could ndt have been prejudiced.
If they had thought that the pl'aintiff h'ad
possibly assumed the risk, it would have been
'to the defendan ts' benefit, not to their disadvantage or prejudice."
1

1

The respondent su'bmfts that the Bruner case
represents one of the bes't discussions by this cour't
11
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Wi th respect to contentions of the kind made by the
appellant in this case tha:t the appelliant was prejudiced by the giving of the court's irrstrudtions
referred to.
1

POINT II.
THE 'TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

It is 1the position of the respondent tha:t the
plaintiff was by no means prejudiced by the instructions complained of and that upon all the evidence
the case was properly submitted by the court. on the
basis of these instructions, and the plaintiff's motion for a new trial should have been denied.
!The principal part of the argument under this
point has been presented in the argument under
Point I because in essence they ~are part of the s·ame
proposrtion.
'The respondent again submits to the court that
based upon the record :the a~tivity of the plaintiff
in crossing the street and either not looking in the
direction from which the defendant's automobile
proceeded or having looked, failing to see what there
to be seen, she was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of taw under either Instruction No. 7
or Instruction No. 8.
Based upon the physical evidence presented and
the 'testimony of the appellant's expert witness, the
appellant was s'truck approxim~ately three seconds
12
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after she left the curb by an automobile which was
no more 'than 125 feet from her a:t a time she claimed
she looked and failed to see 'i't there.
CONCLUSION
Based upon a fair appraisal of the testimony,
physical evidence and the record presented by this
appeal, the respondentt respectfully submits 'to the
court 'that the verdict and judgment thereon appealed from should be affirmed.

RespectfuHy submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
Salt Lake Ci'ty, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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